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Despite the extensive literature on the tobacco industry, there has been little 
attempt to study how transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) coordinate their 
political activities globally, or to theorise TTC strategies within the context of global 
governance structures and policy processes. This article draws on three concepts 
from political science – policy transfer, multi-level governance and venue shifting – 
to analyse TTCs’ integrated, global strategies to oppose augmented packaging 
requirements across multiple jurisdictions. Following Uruguay’s introduction of 
extended labelling requirements, Australia became the first country in the world to 
require tobacco products to be sold in standardised (‘plain’) packaging in 2012. 
Governments in the European Union (EU), including in the United Kingdom (UK) and 
Ireland, adopted similar laws, with other member states due to follow. TTCs 
vehemently opposed these measures and developed coordinated, global strategies 
to oppose their implementation, exploiting the complexity of contemporary global 
governance arrangements. These included a series of legal challenges in various 
jurisdictions, alongside political lobbying and public relations campaigns. This article 
draws on analysis of public documents and 32 semi-structured interviews with key 
policy actors. It finds that TTCs developed coordinated and highly integrated 
strategies to oppose packaging restrictions across multiple jurisdictions and levels of 
governance.  
Keywords: Tobacco industry; plain packaging; multi-level governance; policy 
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Introduction 
Outside of the largely closed Chinese market, controlled by the state-owned China National 
Tobacco Corporation, the global tobacco industry is dominated by four transnational tobacco 
companies (TTCs) (Campaign for Tobacco free Kids, 2016) – Philip Morris International (PMI), British 
American Tobacco (BAT), Japan Tobacco International (JTI) and Imperial Tobacco – and is now 
undergoing a further phase of consolidation (Financial Times, 2016). These corporations operate as 
oligopolies, segmenting national cigarette markets, controlling prices (Hawkins et al., 2016, Gilmore, 
2012, Hedley, 2007), and employing sophisticated marketing strategies to drive consumption (Hafez 
and Ling, 2005). 
 A now extensive literature documents TTCs’ efforts to resist regulation and shape policy 
environments through lobbying, financial contributions, research funding and the formation of front 
groups (Hurt et al., 2009, Savell et al., 2014, Smith et al., 2013), including efforts to resist and curtail  
packaging restrictions,  such as the Australian government’s efforts to introduce standardised 
(‘plain’) packaging (Jarman, 2015, Chapman and Freeman, 2013). Partly as a result of these studies, 
TTCs began to be marginalised from the policy process in many contexts, with Article 5.3 of the 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) requiring governments to take measures to 
protect health policy ‘from commercial and other vested interests of the tobacco industry’ (WHO, 
2003). Imperfect implementation of Article 5.3 (Fooks et al., 2017), however, means political access 
and influence is still extensive in many settings (Savell et al., 2014). Furthermore, as their access to 
decision makers has eroded, TTCs have developed both more covert and more confrontational 
strategies to achieve their political objectives. This has involved the use of third parties and cross-
industry trade associations (Katz, 2015) and legal challenges in an attempt to prevent, amend or 
delay anti-tobacco measures. This includes cases brought under World Trade Organization (WTO) 
law (Eckhardt et al., 2015) and bilateral investment treaties (BITs) via investor-state dispute 
settlement (ISDS) mechanisms (Hawkins and Holden, 2016). The objective for the industry in 
mounting legal challenges may not only be to defend sales in the market in question, but to protect 
their interests globally (Hawkins and Holden, 2016, Côté, 2014). 
Despite the large volume of literature detailing tobacco industry political activities, there is 
little research explicitly analysing the ability of TTCs to coordinate such activities across multiple 
jurisdictions (see Holden and Lee, 2011 for an exception). This is particularly noteworthy given the 
now global nature of tobacco control debates and the similar policy challenges which the industry 
faces in different national markets as a result of international advocacy networks and the FCTC, 
which sets out best practise for signatory states seeking to implement effective tobacco control 
policies. This has meant that policies, such as standardised packaging (SP), are often the subject of 
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global debate before being taken up by national policy makers and, once they do come onto the 
policy agenda in one country, may spread quickly to others. Country-level case studies of the 
tobacco industry have made an important contribution to understanding TTC activities and have 
been invaluable in promoting the cause of tobacco control. However, they are unable to explain fully 
the political strategies of global economic actors operating within the institutional context of a 
complex system of overlapping global, regional and national regulatory jurisdictions. Furthermore, 
they fail to capture the precise nature of the policy challenges facing the tobacco industry in this 
globalized policy environment, or the new opportunities that it affords them to stymie tobacco 
control measures. A global perspective on TTCs’ strategies is needed to understand in greater depth 
the ways in which TTCs are adapting and responding to transnational policy processes and multi-
level governance structures by coordinating their activities across jurisdictions. 
In this article we begin to address the gap in the current literature, adopting a global 
perspective to understand the ways in which TTCs pursue globally-coordinated political strategies to 
respond to global policy challenges across multiple jurisdictions. To understand TTC strategy it is 
necessary to examine the policy context in which they are acting. To do this we draw on three 
concepts from political science: policy transfer, multi-level governance, and venue shifting. Together, 
these provide an important analytical toolkit for examining both the policy context in which TTCs 
operate and the strategies which they pursue. Below, we elaborate on these key analytical concepts, 
before setting out our methods. 
 
Policy Transfer 
Advances in information and communication technologies in the last two decades have 
facilitated processes of ‘policy learning’ (Dunlop and Radaelli, 2013) and ‘knowledge transfer’ 
(Shaxson et al., 2012) between countries, as issues and interventions current in one location come 
onto the agenda in another. This process, often referred to as policy transfer, may be particularly 
prevalent where transnational mechanisms exist to facilitate this. The process of European 
integration, for example, facilitates policy transfer between both member states and different levels 
of decision making within the context of broader processes of Europeanization (Radaelli, 2008), 
although the UK’s vote to leave the EU indicates that such processes are not irreversible. In the field 
of tobacco control we have witnessed the emergence of international advocacy and expert networks 
that have been influential in driving forwards tobacco-control measures globally (Wipfli, 2015, 
Gneiting, 2015), whilst the FCTC provides a strong normative framework for such policy transfer. 
 
Multi-level Governance 
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The period since the Second World War has seen the emergence of a highly developed, and 
overlapping, set of political and legal structures above the level of the nation state, which attempts 
to manage globalization through the creation of rules-based systems of supranational governance. 
Scholars have argued that these developments represent a process of ‘global constitutionalization’, 
which may disproportionately serve the needs of transnational corporations (TNCs) versus citizens 
(Hawkins and Holden, 2016, Thompson, 2012). The creation of new policy-making forums means 
that decisions affecting a given policy area (such as tobacco control) can potentially be taken in 
multiple forums and at different levels. The concept of multi-level governance has been applied 
extensively to examine policy making within the EU (Marks et al., 1996, Hooghe and Marks, 2001), 
but  is relevant also to other supranational forms of governance (Stephenson, 2013, Marks and 
Hooghe, 2004, Bache and Flinders, 2004).  
 
Venue Shifting 
The existence of multiple policy-making venues potentially allows policy actors to influence 
and challenge policies simultaneously through multiple channels and to engage in venue shifting 
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1993): attempting to move the locus of decision making to the level or 
forum in which their interests are most likely to be served . Baumgartner and Jones (1991) note that 
venue shifting may involve the redefinition of the ‘policy image’, and requires mastery of the 
‘specialized and arcane language’ and ‘complicated rules’ of alternative venues. This latter point is of 
particular relevance when considering legal processes, especially those of trade and investment law. 
Such forms of transnational law offer the possibility for corporations to tackle potentially global 
policy threats such as SP in a highly effective way. Establishing the incompatibility of packaging 
restrictions with bodies of law such as these would with one stroke stymie the implementation of 
such policies across all jurisdictions to which the body of law applies. 
The institutional structures of multi-level governance and the processes of policy transfer 
between jurisdictions thus provide the crucial context within which TTC political strategies must be 
understood. This context requires TTCs to respond in a coordinated way across jurisdictions if they 
are to successfully pursue their interests, but if they are able to do so it affords them additional 
opportunities to oppose public policies via attempts at venue shifting.  
 We apply these concepts to map the spread of strengthened packaging and labelling 
requirements across jurisdictions and to examine the coordinated nature of TTCs’ strategies to 
obstruct such requirements across these jurisdictions. We focus on packaging and labelling 
requirements because they are at the forefront of contemporary tobacco-control initiatives, have 
spread extensively between jurisdictions, and are of fundamental importance to TTCs’ commercial 
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strategies. Given the fungibility between manufactured cigarettes (Hurt et al., 2009), product 
differentiation depends on branding and marketing (Hoek et al., 2012) and TTCs vehemently oppose 
restrictions on this. In many contexts, cigarette packs are among the last remaining sites of 
marketing activity for TTCs. As such, it is an issue of the utmost importance to the tobacco industry. 
We focus principally on policy developments in Uruguay, Australia – the first country in the world to 
introduce SP – and the European Union (EU). Whilst stopping short of SP, the Uruguay case was an 
early example of strengthened packaging requirements and was opposed by the industry in similar 
ways to SP. The EU Tobacco Products Directive (TPD) contained an explicit acknowledgement that 
member states could implement SP, leading to its introduction initially in Ireland and the UK. Below, 
we outline our methods, before presenting our findings. Given the significant volume of data 
provided, the article makes extensive use of tables and figures to demonstrate the concurrent and 
overlapping policy developments and industry responses across jurisdictions. 
 
Methods 
We used both documentary and interview sources to examine connections between policy 
developments relating to strengthened tobacco packaging requirements in Uruguay, Australia, the 
UK, Ireland and at EU level. Case selection was purposive, reflecting the jurisdictions in which 
packaging first entered onto the policy agenda globally and in the European context. Australia was 
the first country in the world to adopt SP, whilst the UK and Ireland were the first EU member states 
to follow suit, with policy debates developing in parallel. Ireland also played a key role in the 
development of the EU TPD during its presidency of the Council of the EU. Developments in Uruguay 
were a precursor to global debates on SP and show the wider significance of packaging restrictions 
beyond the specific issue of SP. The article is part of a wider study of tobacco industry influence over 
policy in the context of globalization. Here, we draw principally on documentary sources, but use 
interviews conducted as part of the broader study to add additional details to our timeline of events 
on SP and the industry responses to these. The objective of the article is not to examine the 
positions or perceptions of different policy actors (in either the industry or public health sectors), 
but to take a macro-level view of the development of SP policy globally and the coordinated TTC 
response to this across national policy spaces and at different levels of governance. 
 Documents relating to these debates were retrieved by SM from online searches relating to 
policy debates on tobacco products packaging in those jurisdictions and industry responses to such 
requirements, including documents relating to litigation in domestic courts and trade and 
investment disputes in bilateral and regional forums and the WTO. Internet searches were 
conducted initially using key words relating to the relevant tobacco packaging legislation in each 
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jurisdiction. Thereafter a ‘snowballing’ search technique was used to follow up sources and key 
phrases cited in the documents initially retrieved.  Documents originating from relevant sources such 
as government departments, courts, international agencies, tobacco companies or allied 
organisations, or tobacco-control organisations were included in the study. Using these, we 
compiled a timeline of the development of tobacco packaging measures across these jurisdictions 
and TTCs’ responses to these (see Table 1 and Figure 1). Documentary and interview data were used 
to compile a matrix of industry tactics to oppose packaging requirements in these jurisdictions, in 
order to summarise and provide examples of the types of tactics used and the venues in which they 
were deployed (see Table 2).  
Semi-structured interviews (Rubin and Rubin, 2011) for the wider project were conducted 
with government ministers and officials from national governments, officials from the European 
Commission, Members of the European Parliament, public health advocates and other civil society 
actors engaged in the policy process. BH undertook 17 interviews related to tobacco control issues 
at the EU level in Brussels between September 2014 and December 2016 and 15 interviews in 
Dublin, Edinburgh and via skype between October 2015 and October 2016 to examine policy 
developments at the national level and the role of the Irish government in the conclusion of the TPD 
during its Presidency of the Council of the EU in 2014. Skype interviews included representatives of 
the Australian tobacco control community, but not actors engaged in Uruguayan policy. This reflects 
both the practical and linguistic challenges of undertaking such interviews and the principle focus of 
the article on SP.  
Interviewees were identified through purposive sampling via a review of documents relating 
to the TPD and the plans to introduce SP in Ireland, and through online searches of actors and 
organisations engaged in these policy debates. ‘Snowballing’ was employed to identify further 
potential contacts from interviewees. Interviews were recorded, transcribed and coded by BH using 
Nvivo 10 qualitative data analysis software. Interview data are not quoted here due to space 
constraints, but have been used to inform the analysis and have been triangulated with 
documentary material.  
 
The global spread of tobacco packaging policy 
The entry into force of the FCTC in 2005, and the adoption of guidelines on packaging and 
labelling by the FCTC Conference of the Parties in 2008, were key moments in the global spread of 
tobacco packaging regulations. While the FCTC stopped short of mandating plain packaging, the 
guidelines encouraged governments to consider adopting such measures. The WHO’s ‘MPOWER’ 
package of policy guidance, also developed in 2008, particularly encouraged the use of graphic 
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warning labels (WHO, 2008). In 2009 various governments began making concrete moves to legislate 
on the issue. The EU set in motion the process of revising the TPD, with the issue of packaging and 
labelling requirements at the head of proposals from the European Commission and a key objective 
for tobacco-control advocates. In Uruguay, President Tabaré Vazquez introduced legislation 
stipulating that graphic health warnings would take up 80% of the front and back of cigarette packs 
(raised from 50%). At the same time, a National Health Task Force (NHTF) in Australia released a report 
that strongly recommended plain packaging as part of a comprehensive approach. 
Following the successful introduction of SP in Australia, it quickly came onto the policy agenda 
elsewhere, including several EU member states. This represented precisely the kind of policy transfer 
which TTCs had feared and which they sought to avoid through legal challenges in Australia. Western 
Europe remains a key market for TTCs, accounting for around 19% of the global cigarette market 
(Campaign for Tobacco free Kids, 2016) and preventing SP there was strategically important in 
preventing the wider spread of SP. Ireland became the first country in the EU to enact legislation to 
introduce SP in March 2015, closely followed by the United Kingdom (UK) and France, with similar 
measures under consideration in other member-states.  
 
The response of the global tobacco industry 
TTC responses are notable for the simultaneous utilisation of multiple legal venues, including 
both domestic courts and trade and investment disputes systems, in parallel with lobbying and other 
policy-influencing strategies. The range of tactics utilised by TTCs is presented in Tables 1 and 2. 
Table 1 shows how cigarette packaging policy developed over time across the five jurisdictions 
examined here and how TTCs responded with various forms of political activity and litigation. It 
demonstrates how packaging policies developed contemporaneously, but at different speeds, in 
different jurisdictions and how TTCs responded to these policy initiatives with similar tactics in each 
context.  
[Table 1 about here] 
 Table 2 distils the tactics used by TTCs into four broad categories – litigation, lobbying, 
threatening plant closures, and the use of third parties - indicating how specific instances of these 
were used in each jurisdiction. Activities included direct lobbying of legislators and officials, public 
relations campaigns to mobilise the support of other businesses and the general public, and 
attempts to refocus the ‘policy image’ of the issue away from health and onto trade and intellectual 
property as well as the alleged negative consequences of the policy, such as increased smuggling and 
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associated criminality. The similarity of these tactics across jurisdictions suggests a high level of 
coordination globally. Attempts to mobilise third parties to flood consultations with negative 
submissions are just one example of similar tactics used in multiple jurisdictions.  
[Table 2 about here] 
The use of similar forms of litigation in multiple jurisdictions is clear.  This involved attacking 
new policies on multiple fronts using both national and supranational legal mechanisms to challenge 
proposed laws; identifying the most effective channels for challenging laws; and attempts to 
establish their general incompatibility with transnational bodies of law that could strike down 
packaging restrictions simultaneously in multiple jurisdictions. Figure 1 illustrates the overlapping 
timing of legislative processes and litigation initiated by TTCs in response, suggesting both a process 
of policy transfer between jurisdictions, and coordination of strategies employed by TTCs in different 
jurisdictions. The latter include the use of domestic courts in all countries and the simultaneous use 
of different transnational forms of law, including those of the WTO, ISDS mechanisms and the EU.  
In Australia, different forms of litigation were pursued concurrently, with an ISDS dispute 
under the Australia-Hong Kong Bilateral Investment Treaty (AHKBIT) and a WTO dispute launched by 
sympathetic countries before Australia’s domestic courts had ruled.  Similarly, an ISDS dispute was 
launched in Uruguay at the same time that domestic court action was pursued. In the UK and 
Ireland, legal action was initiated under both national and EU law, but not under international trade 
or investment agreements. This mainly reflects the existence of an alternative body of law, overseen 
by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), through which TTCs could seek to protect their 
interests. This avenue offered TTCs the normative force of a highly developed and institutionalised 
supranational legal system with robust enforcement mechanisms.  Furthermore, a successful 
challenge under EU law would invalidate measures across all 28 members-states in one move. 
Similarly, the WTO and AHKBIT cases against Australia were not only intended to prevent the policy 
there, but to serve as deterrents to other governments considering similar measures, with the 
prevarication and delay apparent in the UK case suggesting that this had some effect. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
It appears that TTCs used sophisticated forms of venue shifting to oppose SP. PMI, for 
example, restructured its Asian operations in order to move formal ownership of its Australian 
company to its Hong Kong subsidiary, thus facilitating its use of the AHKBIT to initiate a dispute with 
the Australian government. Legal challenges by private actors under EU law are filed through 
domestic courts in member-states (with referrals from national courts to the CJEU on specific points 
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of EU law possible), although the rulings in these cases are applicable across the EU. This means 
plaintiffs have the potential to take action against EU law in any one of the 28 member-states in 
which they have relevant interests. Even with the oversight of the CJEU, decisions by national courts 
and their interpretation and application of EU law may vary in subtle but important ways for a 
variety of reasons, including the different juridical traditions in these countries (e.g. the UK system of 
common law). Thus, there may be perceived advantages for plaintiffs in initiating legal action in one 
jurisdiction over another.  
In the case of the TPD, PMI initiated its legal challenge through the High Court in London. 
This appears to be part of a strategy by TTCs to test the compatibility of SP with EU law in the 
jurisdiction most likely to favour their interests. In a legal challenge mounted by JTI against the Irish 
government’s introduction of SP, for example, the company successfully opposed attempts by 
Ireland to refer the case to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling, with parties agreeing to be bound by 
the judgement of the European Court in the referral from the London courts in a parallel case. TTCS’ 
decision to oppose multiple referrals to the CJEU would seem to run counter to their strategy of 
attacking national policies on multiple fronts. However, in this instance the strategy appears instead 
to be to seek a single knock-out blow to SP across the EU by attempting to establish its illegality 
under single market rules, and reflected their belief that this was the arena in which they were most 
likely to succeed.  
 
Discussion  
TTCs’ activities to oppose SP across jurisdictions suggests that these were part of a coherent global 
strategy. This builds on past findings about TTCs’ strategies in opposing SP (Jarman, 2013, Jarman, 
2015) and the effects of multi-level governance arrangements in augmenting the power of TNCs to 
oppose regulation through venue shifting (Holden and Hawkins, 2016). The attempt by TTCs to 
redefine SP as a trade and intellectual property issue, rather than a health issue, constitutes an 
example both of attempted ‘policy image’ change and of an attempted shift to venues with highly 
specialised rules, such as the WTO, consistent with Baumgartner and Jones’ early work on venue 
shifting (1991).   
Within the multi-level institutional structures that have emerged in the context of 
globalization, TTCs were able to take concurrent action in multiple jurisdictions. For example, 
tobacco industry actors simultaneously initiated disputes in domestic courts, at the EU level (in the 
case of the UK and Ireland), at the WTO and via BITs (with Uruguay and Australia). This finding is 
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consistent with previous evidence that TTCs have coordinated political activity across multiple 
jurisdictions (Holden and Lee, 2011). It is also consistent with recent analysis by Reuters journalists, 
using internal PMI documents and published subsequent to our study, which confirms the globally-
coordinated and multi-level nature of PMI’s lobbying and legal strategies (Kalra et al., 2017). The 
simultaneous actions against Australia perhaps contradict the expectation that TTCs would act 
sequentially in order to delay the implementation of legislation for as long as possible. In part, this 
may reflect the fact that new laws can be implemented even while WTO and BIT cases are 
proceeding, as was the case in Australia. It may also reflect the fact that defeating SP was so 
important to the industry that a strategic decision was taken to attempt to block it in Australia, the 
first country to adopt it, with every means available, or to undermine government responses by 
forcing them to act on multiple fronts simultaneously. The high costs of defending multiple cases, in 
terms of money, time and human resources, may have presented a disincentive to proceed. The 
prospect of facing multiple concurrent legal challenges alongside concerted lobbying campaigns 
would also deter other resource-limited governments considering similar measures, particularly low 
and middle-income countries and/or those undergoing austerity programmes. This analysis is 
supported by previous studies that have identified such ‘chilling effects’ on policy and the explicit 
objective of corporations to deter others when initiating ISDS cases, including by the tobacco 
industry (Tavernise, 2013, Fooks and Gilmore, 2013, Côté, 2014). 
The strategies employed by TTCs have had mixed success. The recourse to legal challenge 
underlines their relative marginalisation in policy debates in many jurisdictions. Unable to shape or 
prevent unfavourable policies as insiders through relationship building and lobbying, they may resort 
to challenging governments as outsiders in legal forums. So far, legal challenges have failed to 
prevent the introduction of SP in the countries examined here. This again reflects the shifting 
political and legal consensus about the harmfulness of smoking, the necessity of effective tobacco-
control policies and thus their ability to trump other legal obligations and political objectives such as 
trade liberalisation. Both the Australia-Hong Kong and Uruguay-Switzerland BIT panels found against 
PMI, as did courts in all national jurisdictions and at the EU level. At the time of writing, the WTO 
disputes were still outstanding, although early indications were that here too the panel would find 
against TTCs. 
The failure of cases brought under EU law establishes jurisprudence around SP confirming its 
compatibility with EU law for any member state considering its adoption. A similar ruling in the 
ongoing WTO case may also pave the way for yet more countries to act. This is the very opposite of 
TTCs’ intentions, which sought to block the policy at the global and European levels. However, there 
have been significant delays in the implementation of SP (e.g. in the UK) which may have stemmed 
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in part from TTCs’ actions, whilst packaging requirements in the TPD were watered down from the 
original proposals. The various legal actions may also have exerted a deterrent or ‘chilling’ effect on 
other governments considering strengthened tobacco-control laws while these issues remained sub 
judice (Hawkins and Holden, 2016). 
 
Conclusion 
 This article has begun to address the gap in the literature on TTC behaviour by establishing 
the importance of the global institutional and policy-process context within which TTC strategies 
must be crafted and to which they must respond. Understanding the context of multi-level 
governance and the interconnected nature of policy debates across jurisdictions, and TTCs’ 
strategies in response to this, is vital both for policy analysts seeking to understand policy outcomes 
and practitioners attempting to implement effective tobacco-control policies. Drawing on three key 
concepts from political science – policy transfer, multi-level governance and venue shifting – we 
have demonstrated how effective public health policy initiatives can travel quickly between different 
jurisdictions, but also how TTCs have acted in a coordinated manner globally to take advantage of 
supranational governance structures to challenge these policies via multiple litigation and lobbying 
processes. This underlines both the effectiveness of international collaborations between policy 
makers and advocates and the need to coordinate policy responses at different levels of governance. 
Whilst TTCs have been unsuccessful in blocking stronger packaging requirements thus far, their 
concerted and coordinated opposition makes policy innovation costly for governments, can 
substantially delay policy adoption and implementation, and may exert a ‘chilling effect,’ particularly 
on less well-resourced governments. Furthermore, the possibility that a specific measure can be 
ruled illegal at the European or even global level by a single decision underlines the need for careful 
drafting of international agreements and the firm establishment of the norm that health 
considerations be granted priority over other objectives, such as trade liberalisation. 
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Table 1: Timeline of significant events relating to strengthened cigarette packaging requirements 
in different jurisdictions 
 Uruguay Australia EU UK Ireland 
2009 
MAY: Uruguay adopts 
new regulation 
mandating for graphic 
warnings covering 80% 
of pack surface.  
DEC: New regulation 
comes into force. 
DEC: Abal Hermanos, 
the Uruguay affiliate of 
PMI, brings challenge to 
the Supreme Court of 
Uruguay. 
JUN: NPHT publishes 
report Making Smoking 
History (NHPT 2009). 
JUL: PMI commissioned 
report by the law firm 
LALIVE is published, 
arguing that SP is in 
violation of WTO law 
(LALIVE 2009). 
FEB: European 
Commission launches 
review of the TPD. 
MAR: Impact 
assessment (IA) for 
TPD begins. 
 
  
2010 
FEB: President 
Vasquez leaves office 
after raising tobacco tax 
to 70%. 
FEB: PMI files for 
investment arbitration 
under the Switzerland-
Uruguay BIT (SUBIT). 
Claims that the law 
infringes intellectual 
property rights and 
breaches Uruguay’s 
obligations under the 
agreement. 
JULY: New President 
Mujica outlines cut in 
size of graphic warnings 
to 65%; a perceived 
victory for the TTCs. 
NOV: Supreme Court of 
Uruguay unanimously 
rejects Abal Hermanos’ 
claim. 
APR: Prime Minister 
Rudd announces ‘Anti-
Smoking Package’, 
based on NHPT report 
including SP from July 
2012. 
APR: Think tank, the 
Institute of Public Affairs 
(IPA), release a report 
and related media 
activity condemning 
plain packaging and 
cost to taxpayers (IPA 
2010). IPA had 
previously received 
funding from TTCs. 
MAY: EC Secretariat-
General Catherine Day 
meets with PMI in a 
publically undisclosed 
meeting; one of several 
meetings between 
European Commission 
officials and TTCs. 
JUN: Day ‘has coffee’ 
with PMI. 
SEP-DEC: Public 
Consultation on TPD, 
receives over 85,000 
submissions, most of 
which appear to be 
linked to TTCs. 
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2011 
- SUBIT arbitration 
continues. 
OCT: PMI moves its 
manufacturing plant, 
from Uruguay to 
Argentina, citing ‘wide 
availability of illegal 
products’; ‘reduced 
demand’ and 
‘regulatory/ fiscal 
measures that limit the 
ability to market our 
products profitably’. 
NOV: President Mujica 
confirms the departure 
of PMI will not affect 
anti-tobacco policies. 
FEB: PM Asia acquires 
a controlling interest in 
Philip Morris Australia, 
creating the potential to 
launch claims under the 
Australia-Hong Kong 
BIT (AHKBIT). 
MAR: Website 
campaign launched by 
BAT (plainpack.com); 
followed by Imperial 
(NoNannyState.com) 
and PMI (plain-
packing.com). 
APR: Draft legislation 
for Tobacco Plain 
Packaging Bill released 
for consultation. 
JUL: Tobacco Plain 
Packaging Bill 2011 
introduced to 
Parliament. 
NOV: Bill passed 
through both houses. 
NOV: PMI initiates 
investment dispute 
under AHKBIT. 
DEC: BAT and Imperial 
file challenge through 
high court; JTI and PMI 
join case later in the 
month. 
MAR: Day meets 
Swedish Match and PMI 
in publically undisclosed 
meetings. 
APR: Commissioner for 
Agriculture and Rural 
Development invited to 
dinner debate by 
UNITAB (a tobacco 
lobby group). 
JUN: Senior EC officials 
invited by PMI to 
presentation of KPMG 
study on illicit tobacco 
trade. 
DEC: Day and others 
meet with tobacco trade 
bodies (ECMA and BdZ) 
in publically undisclosed 
meetings. 
DEC: PMI and BAT 
meet with Business 
Europe and VNO-NCW 
(a Dutch business 
association) to stress 
the TPD’s ‘spill-over’ 
into other sectors. 
  
MAR: Department of 
Health (DoH) published 
White Paper, 
announcing it will 
consider introducing SP 
following a public 
consultation.. 
MAY: DoH consults with 
Australian government, 
requesting impact 
assessment or 
cost/benefit analyses 
conducted on SP. 
 
2012 
- SUBIT arbitration 
continues throughout 
year. 
- AHKBIT case 
continues throughout 
year. 
MAR: Ukraine initiates 
dispute at WTO, arguing 
that the law breaches 
the WTO’s GATT, TBT 
and TRIPs Agreements.  
APR: Honduras joins 
WTO case.  
JUL: Dominican 
Republic joins dispute at 
WTO. 
AUG: Australian High 
Court rules, against 
PMI, that SP is not 
contrary to the 
constitution. 
DEC: Deadline for all 
cigarettes to be sold in 
SP. 
JUL: TPD IA ends; Day 
delays launch of the 
Inter-Services 
Consultation (ISC), 
saying ‘there are a 
number of substantial 
issues needing further 
attention’. 
AUG: Leaked PMI 
internal strategy 
documents reveal 
meetings with over one 
third of MEPs. 
SEP: Day’s emails 
suggest that her 
intervention led SP to 
be removed from TPD. 
SEP: ISC delayed for 
second time at Day’s 
request. 
OCT: EU Health 
Commissioner John 
Dalli is forced to resign 
due to a ‘cash for 
influence’ scandal, 
resulting in a third delay 
to ISC. 
NOV-DEC: Drafting of 
legislative proposal, 
after 3-month delay. 
APR: First UK 
Government 
consultation on SP 
commences. 
APR-JUN: TTCs fund 
and promote several 
anti-SP reports and 
canvassing campaigns, 
including a report by the 
Anti-Counterfeiting 
Group and British 
Brands Group and the 
‘plain packaging 
postcard campaign’ by 
the Tobacco Retail 
Alliance and. 
JUL: Consultation 
extended due to high 
volume of responses 
associated with TTCs 
attempts to flood 
consultation. 668,443 
submissions received, 
including 2,444 
‘detailed’ submissions.  
AUG: Consultation 
ends. 
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2013 
- SUBIT arbitration 
continues throughout 
year. 
- AHKBIT case 
continues throughout 
year. 
MAY: Cuba joins WTO 
case. 
SEP: Indonesia joins 
WTO dispute. 
It emerges that BAT and 
Philip Morris are 
covering some states’ 
legal costs in WTO 
dispute. 
 
JUN: Legislation passes 
through Council. 
JUL: The centre-right 
European People’s 
Party (EPP) - the largest 
party in Parliament and 
a target of PMI lobbying 
-  requests a delay to 
scheduled vote in 
European Parliament 
(EP). 
OCT: Postponed vote 
takes place, passes 
through EP. 
JAN: TTCs meet with 
DoH. 
MAY: SP is dropped 
from Queen’s speech.  
JUL: DoH publishes 
summary report on 
consultation. Govt. says 
it will wait and see what 
happens in Australia 
before proceeding. 
NOV: Govt. U-turn, 
announcing it will 
consider SP. 
Commissions Chantler 
Review to look into the 
evidence on SP. 
DEC: Proposed 
amendment to Children 
& Families Bill 
published, which would 
introduce SP. 
MAY: Taoiseach and 
senior ministers heavily 
criticised for meeting 
with tobacco industry 
delegation. 
MAY: Govt. announces 
it will be second country 
in the world to introduce 
SP. 
JUL: Six American 
business groups, 
including US Chamber 
of Commerce, urge 
Taoiseach to rethink 
proposals, arguing that 
it is destruction of 
legitimate trademarks. 
NOV: Cabinet approves 
General Scheme for the 
Public Health 
(Standardised 
Packaging of Tobacco) 
Bill 2013. 
DEC: Joint Oireachtas 
Committee on Health 
and Children invited to 
undertake consultation. 
2014 
- SUBIT Arbitration 
continues throughout 
year. 
- WTO and AHKBIT 
cases continue. 
APR: PMI announces 
plans to move cigarette 
manufacturing from 
Australia to Korea. 
DEC: TTCs negative 
reports to mark 2nd 
anniversary of SP. 
 
APR: Final text of TPD 
agreed. 
JUN: PMI and BAT 
initiate legal challenge 
to TPD through UK 
courts, arguing that the 
EU acted without a valid 
legal basis; that the 
Directive is 
disproportionate, and 
infringes the principle of 
subsidiarity. 
DEC: Case is referred 
to the CJEU. Claim 
supported by JTI and 
Imperial as ‘interested 
parties’. 
 
 
FEB: Parliament adopts 
amendments to 
Children and Families 
Bill on SP. 
APR: Chantler Review 
published, arguing SP 
will reduce smoking 
rates in children. 
JUN-AUG: A second 
public consultation on 
SP launched. TTCs 
again mobilises allies to 
submit to the 
consultation. It receives 
137,711 responses, of 
which 1,307 were 
‘detailed’ responses. 
JUL: JTI announce 
closure of its factory in 
Northern Ireland within 
four years, citing the 
TPD as one of the 
reasons. 
AUG: Govt. drafts 
legislation and notifies 
EU of intent to introduce 
SP. 
JAN-MAR: Consultation 
elicits huge volume of 
response from parties 
with both direct and 
indirect links to TTCs. 
MAR: TTC web page 
campaign ‘Plain packs 
plain stupid’ heavily 
promoted. 
MAR: Independent 
review of evidence 
published (Hammond 
2014), concluding that 
SP would help Ireland 
achieve its public health 
objectives. 
APR: Report by Joint 
Oireachtas Committee 
released, strongly 
supporting SP. 
JUN: Bill introduced in 
Parliament. 
NOV-DEC: TTCs 
attempt media 
campaign to discredit 
scientific evidence, e.g. 
arguing it won’t cut 
smoking rates. 
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2015 
- SUBIT arbitration 
continues throughout 
year. 
- WTO case continues 
throughout the year. 
DEC: AHKBIT 
arbitration panel finds in 
favour of Australia. 
DEC: Preliminary 
opinions issued by 
CJEU’s Advocate 
General, concluding that 
the TPD is valid and 
lawfully adopted. 
JAN: Government 
announces it will 
proceed with SP. 
MAR: Legislation on SP 
passed by both Houses 
of Parliament. 
MAY: PMI and BAT file 
lawsuit in the High 
Court, stating that the 
legislation violates UK 
and EU law, and the 
regulations unlawfully 
deprive them of their 
trademarks (PMI 2015). 
MAR: Bill is enacted 
and becomes law. 
APR: Minister for 
Children reveals the 
govt. has received 
letters from TTCs 
threatening legal action. 
APR: JTI brings claim 
through Commercial 
Court, arguing that SP 
is contrary to EU 
harmonization 
objectives, and is an 
obstacle to trade 
between EU member 
states. 
JUL: JTI wins fight not 
to have case referred to 
CJEU. Parties agree to 
wait for outcome on 
TPD case taken through 
UK court. 
2016 
JUL: SUBIT arbitration 
panel finds in favour of 
Uruguay, ordering PMI 
to reimburse $7 million 
in legal costs. 
- WTO case continues 
throughout the year. 
 
MAY: CJEU rejects 
TTCs’ claim, arguing 
legislation does not go 
beyond what is 
appropriate and 
necessary to protect 
consumers against the 
risks associated with 
tobacco use. 
- MAY: TPD comes into 
force, allowing a 
transitional period of 
one year for labelling 
requirements for 
tobacco companies to 
sell through pre-existing 
stock. 
MAY: High Court finds 
in favour of UK 
government, the day 
before legislation is due 
to come into force. 
MAY: Plain packaging 
comes into force, 
allowing tobacco 
companies one year to 
achieve full compliance. 
OCT: TTCs take High 
Court ruling to the Court 
of Appeal. 
NOV: Appeal rejected. 
MAY: SP meant to 
come into force after 
CJEU ruling on UK 
case, but delayed due 
to inconclusive Irish 
general election and the 
need to form a 
government. 
Introduction 
rescheduled for May 
2017. 
JUN: Imperial 
announces closure of 
Mullingar factory 
following introduction of 
TPD restrictions on 
rolling tobacco. 
 
Key 
Black Legislation and lobbying processes 
Blue Challenge through domestic courts 
Green Dispute through WTO channels 
Brown Challenge through CJEU 
Red Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) dispute 
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Table 2: Cross-Jurisdictional Comparison of TTC Strategies  
 Uruguay Australia EU UK 
Litigation - Domestic challenge 
through High Court of 
Uruguay. 
- Arbitration under 
Switzerland-Uruguay BIT 
(SUBIT). 
- Domestic challenge 
through High Court of 
Australia. 
- Arbitration under 
Australia-Hong Kong BIT 
(AHKBIT). 
- Dispute through WTO 
brought by five countries. 
- Challenge through UK’s 
Administrative Court. 
- UK challenge referred to 
CJEU. 
- Domestic challenge 
through UK High Court.
Examples of 
lobbying 
 - TTCs give evidence to 
Parliamentary Committee, 
arguing SP will increase 
illicit trade. 
- Send videos to MPs that 
claim SP will increase 
crime. 
- PR and media campaign, 
including anti-SP websites. 
- Attempt to create blocking 
minorities in Council by 
lobbying national 
governments. 
- Attempts to block passage 
of directive in EP by 
lobbying MEPs. 
- Meet highest-level EC 
officials in publically 
undisclosed meetings. 
 
 
- Adverts in broadsheet 
newspapers such as the 
Financial Times
- Front-page
weekly magazine.
- Heavily promote websit
such as ‘Hands Off Our 
Packs’. 
Threaten 
plant 
closures 
- YES - YES - YES - YES 
Use of third 
parties 
 - The IPA undertake 
interviews opposing 
legislation. 
- TTCs mobilise member 
states to oppose SP 
through WTO. 
- Fund groups (e.g. Alliance 
of Australian Retailers), 
claiming to represent 
small businesses opposed 
to SP. 
- Lead mobilisation 
campaigns in several 
countries to encourage 
submissions to the 
consultation. 
- Funds third-party 
campaign websites such as 
‘No Thanks EU’ via 
‘smokers’ rights’ group 
FOREST. 
 
- Funds third
campaigns such as 
Retailers Against 
Smuggling.
- Generates international 
support,
US Congressme
members of the packaging 
industry.
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Figure 1: Timeline of Legal Processes  
 
 
